Criminal prosecution of monopolistic activities in the form of market cartelization is the most sensitive tool for individuals, which can have both a serious deterrent effect and limit behavior that is beneficial to public welfare. This paper discusses the theoretical aspects of the issue of choosing a regime of antitrust enforcement in connection with the design of amendments and enforcement of the norms of Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, taking into account possible differences between the initialization, conclusion of a cartel agreement and participation in it. The article shows that there are various options for the relationship between the concept of conclusion and participation in the agreement, including anti-competitive one. However, this requires the application of realistic assumptions regarding the behavior of individuals. Practical issues of designing criminal penalties for cartels are considered taking into account various legal concepts, including the form and types of guilt, as well as on the basis of a comparison with other articles of the Criminal Code that punish collective unlawful acts. In connection with the problem of reproduction of an inhospitable tradition, the Russian antitrust identified the risks of imputed imputation (risks of I type errors) and insufficient punishment of the cartel organizer (risks of II type errors) in case of underestimating the importance of economic concepts based on the principle of methodological individualism and the assumption of bounded rationality of individuals.
Keywords: cartel, agreement conclusion, agreement participation, objective imputation, methodological individualism, bounded rationality, form of guilt, direct intent.
JEL: K21, K42.
For citation: Shastitko, A. Ye., Dozmarov, K. V. (2021), Realisticity of Individual Choice Model Does Matter: On Cartel Prosecution. Scientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 7-25. DOI: 10.38050/2078-3809-2021-13-2-7-25