Вход
Зарегистрироваться
Напомнить парольDOI: 10.38050/2078-3809-2025-17-3-111-136
Abstract
Although competitive processes in a multi-sided market can have a positive effect on public welfare, ensuring a supply diversity, there is a risk of market power abuse and a continued threat of the emergence of new forms of competition restriction. This review article examines the theoretical provisions of analyzing the state of competition in the market subject to negative and cross network effects. A method is proposed to explain the process stability of slowing down the influence of network effects on consumer utility by the predominance of the saturation effect over the utility effect.
The most effective measures to support competition include regulation of the standard-setting process, access provision to essential facilities (for example, hardware or software), and implication of patent law and licensing to protect the rights of the product developer in regard to the system owner. Limiting the negative network externality impact on the consumer side becomes a core function of the regulator. The need to distinguish between cross- and indirect network effects remains under question.
Keywords: network effect, negative network effect, indirect network effect, standardization, operating system, multisided markets, dominance, regulation.
JEL: D62, L15, L22, L44, L52.
For citation: Bogolyubova, V.S. (2025) Theoretical Framework for Regulation of Multisided Markets Subject to Network Effects. Scientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 111-136. DOI: 10.38050/2078-3809-2025-17-3-111-136.
Download 